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The Social Psychologising of Emotion and Gender 
A Critical Perspective 
 
Abigail Locke 
Abstract  
This chapter offers an overview of psychology’s approach to sex 
differences in emotion, beginning from a discussion of how 
psychology has approached emotion. The chapter takes a 
critical, social-constructionist stance on emotion and critiques 
psychology’s essentialist stance. Moreover, it introduces a new 
direction in psychology in which emotion and gender are studied 
from a discursive perspective, in which emotion words and 
concepts can function interactionally. The article considers two 
examples. In the first, a woman is positioned as emotional and 
by implication, irrational. The second example investigates how 
the popular concept of ‘emotion work’, one that typically 
constructs women as down-trodden, can in fact be used as a 
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resource for young women to manage their identities in 
interactions. Indeed it is constructed as something that makes 
them powerful in relation to the vulnerable males they discuss. 
This chapter will provide a critical overview of psychology’s stance 
on emotion and gender. Since psychology’s inception as an academic 
discipline in the late nineteenth century, the topic of emotion has been 
one of its major themes, from early behaviourist theories of James in 
1884 to cognitive explanations (e.g. Lazarus 1994), through to studies 
in affective neuroscience (Davidson 2000; LeDoux 1995; Panksepp 
1992) and social constructionist and discursive accounts (Edwards 
1999; Harre 1983; Locke and Edwards 2003). In many social 
psychological studies, two main approaches have been taken to 
differences between the sexes with regards to emotional experience 
and expression:the essentialist and the social-constructionist approach. 
This article surveys their characteristics and then introduces a more 
recent development in psychology’s study of gender and emotions, the 
discursive approach. This approach is inspired by the social-
constructivist movement, but takes a new perspective by focusing on 
the ways in which emotion talk is employed strategically in local 
interaction.  
 The essentialist approach of emotions in psychology treats 
differences in emotion and sex from an essentialist stance, as a matter 
of fact and puts them down to reasons of presumed physiological 
difference between men and women with studies reporting differences 
in physiological reaction or brain structure (e.g. Frankenhaeuser, 
Dunne and Lundberg 1976; Kring and Gordon 1998; Gur, Gunning-
Dixon, Bilker and Gur 2002). Mainstream psychologists tend to take 
an essentialist stance to emotion, regarding it as having cognitive, 
behavioural and biological aspects (e.g. Clore, Ortony and Foss 1987). 
Essentialist psychologists have argued for the existence of a set of 
basic emotions (Darwin 1871; Ekman 1992) that are cross-cultural, 
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universal across time and place, and due to innate human physiology. 
Although there is still some disagreement as to the number of basic 
emotions and the labels given to them, this view within psychology is 
immensely popular with many emotion theorists endorsing it (e.g. 
Arnold 1960; Frijda 1994; James 1884; Lazarus 1994).  
A challenge comes to this side of psychology from social 
psychologists who endorse a social-constructionist perspective on 
emotion. Social-constructionist approaches to emotion claim that 
emotions have a socio-cultural backdrop, and are not simply matters 
of biology. According to Vivien Burr (1995, 2003) in her 
comprehensive text on the subject, social constructionism holds that 
social processes sustain knowledge and that knowledge and action go 
together. Thus, in terms of relationships between sex, gender and 
emotion, social constructionists consider how emotion terms are 
considered within a society, in particular within their assumed 
gendered usage. As a theoretical stance within psychology, social 
constructionism has presented a challenge to the essentialism so 
prevalent within the discipline of psychology, and offered a view that 
challenges realist assumptions and considers historical and cultural 
specificity. Within social psychology, different methods have 
represented themselves as having a social-constructionist backdrop, 
including critical psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis, and 
discursive psychology. We will consider examples from discursive 
psychology in the field of emotion studies further on in the chapter.  
Social constructionist approaches to emotion gained momentum 
when issues around cultural and historical differences in emotion and 
etymology were taken into consideration. The essentialist idea of a 
‘basic set of emotions’ was problematized by cross-cultural studies 
(Heelas 1996). Anthropologists such as Michelle Rosaldo and 
Catherine Lutz found that in certain cultures names for emotions 
existed that were not common to Western society. Lutz’s work with 
the Ifaluk in the Southwest Pacific found that this culture had a 
specific term for justified anger ‘song,’ that was not present in our 
society and argued that claims to feel an emotion are bound up with 
cultural, moral and political considerations rather than inner, discrete 
feelings (Lutz 1988). Similarly, Rosaldo’s work with the Ilongot, a 
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tribe living in the Luzon Island of the Philippines, found emotions to 
be culturally specific rather than universal (Rosaldo 1980). Finally, 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) argued that different cultures 
have different concepts of self and that emotions are part of this notion 
of self, hence emotions are culturally bound up with, and enacted as, 
social processes. These anthropological studies have shown how 
different cultures appear to experience different emotions and, in 
addition, how these emotions work within the moral framework of 
accountability in each culture. Therefore, the work of these three 
anthropologists caused concerns over the claim that emotion is an 
inner, discrete, universal state.  
A second problem for the basic emotions argument came through 
the study of etymology. Studies on the etymology of ‘affect’ terms 
show how the meaning and importance of terms has changed over 
time (E.g. Edwards 1999; Gergen 1995; Harré 1983). For example in 
the sixteenth century, words such as ‘sanguine’ or ‘melancholy’ were 
commonplace and yet are rarely used today (Harré 1983). Edwards 
(1997) examined the etymology of ‘worry’ and ‘surprise’ and noted 
the shifts in meaning that had occurred with these terms. In the case of 
‘worry,’ the term shifted from referring to strangulation in the eighth 
century, to sheep being attacked (‘worried’) by dogs in 1380, to 
today’s meaning in which the term denotes an anxious mind-set. 
Theodore Sarbin (1986) moves the argument one step further to 
examine the etymology of the word ‘emotion’ itself and found that 
until approximately three hundred years ago ‘[e]tymologically, 
emotion denoted outward-directed movement, as in migrations. The 
meaning was transferred to movements within the body. For the past 
300 years or more, observers have focused on such perceived or 
imagined internal movements’ (Sarbin 1986, 84). As Edwards (1997 
1999) argues, such shifts in emotion labels are tied to changes in 
moral orders, social relations and accountability. Thus there are 
similarities between the arguments in the anthropological studies of 
Lutz and Rosaldo and the etymology of emotion labels, which create 
problems for the inner, discrete, and universal conceptualisation of 
emotion.  
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Gender, emotion and the (re)socialisation of expression 
Many researchers argue that traditional stereotypes of the 
emotional woman set against the rational, non-emotional man are 
culturally evident and endorsed (Fischer 1993; Lupton 1998; Lutz 
1990; Timmers, Fischer and Manstead 2003).  
This appears to be the case from early on in childhood. As Widen and 
Russell (2002) note, even pre-schoolers in the USA were aware of 
gender and attributed emotions based on gender stereotypes. This 
construct of females as emotional is an assumption which can be hard 
to undermine, as Shields and Crowley note: ‘stereotypic 
representations of the emotional female / unemotional male are so 
prominent in North American culture that these stereotypes reinforce 
the notion that the starting point for any gendered-based analysis of 
emotion should be gender differences in emotion’ (Shields & Crowley 
1996, 219; their emphasis). For example a study by Brebner (2003) 
using both Australian and international samples on experience and 
intensity of eight emotional states (affection, anger, contentment, fear, 
guilt, joy, pride and sadness), found that women in both samples 
reported a higher frequency of emotions than men. The only emotion 
that men had a higher frequency and intense experiences of was pride. 
Similarly a recent study by Glenberg, Mouilso, Havas and Lindeman 
(2009) found that women were more reactive emotionally than men. 
They further claimed that women understood sadness more than men, 
whereas men had a greater grasp of anger than women. Their 
participants’ task was to comprehend an emotional message when in 
an opposing emotional state. Glenberg et al. found that for women it 
took longer to read a happy message when sad, but for men, it was 
being angry that slowed the reading of a happy sentence. What is of 
interest for the present essay is the way in which sex differences in 
emotion were represented (and accepted by the journal!) as an 
unproblematic statement of fact, rather than a social construct or 
product of socialisation. 
Many studies within psychology that conclude that women are 
more emotional than men focus only on the expression of emotion. 
Hall (1984) conducted a meta-analysis of facial expressiveness and 
found that females were more facially expressive than men. However, 
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in more recent work, Hall, Carter and Horgan (2000) note that ’non-
verbal behavior does not necessarily signify emotion’ (97), that is the 
experience of emotion may indeed differ from the expression of 
emotion. Other studies have reported that women appear more 
prepared to talk about and express emotions than men (Fischer 1993). 
Huston-Comeaux and Kelly (2002) found a link between the 
appropriateness of emotional expression and sex and argue that this 
stereotyping leads to ‘a fairly narrow range of possible emotional 
expressions for women’ (7). Similarly, Brody (2000) found that 
display rules of emotion generally conform to gender stereotypes, and 
that these stereotypes are more robust in interpersonal settings. Simon 
and Nath (2004) found that in American culture, the sexes differed in 
their reporting of the frequency of positive and negative emotions. 
However, they found a strong link between social position and 
emotional expression, with those in lower social positions, often 
women, reporting more negative affect. This demonstrates that the 
relationship between emotion and sex is not a psychological one, but 
rather a societal and cultural construct, with factors like class and 
ethnicity intersecting with gender. Thus, Fischer (1993) claims that 
emotionality should not be considered one of the basic dimensions to 
distinguish the sexes, and that the ‘claim that women are more 
emotional than men tells us more about our cultural stereotypes than 
about actual sex differences in emotions’ (Fischer 1993, 312).  
Psychology has typically offered explanations of phenomena in 
biological and cognitive terms. This, as some feminists have argued, is 
due to its unacknowledged patriarchal foundations (see Burr, 1998 for 
further discussion on this). As Cameron  declares ‘[d]ifferences in 
men’s and women’s verbal behaviours are [...] explained in biological 
terms’ (2007, 8). As recent studies on sex differences and emotion in 
psychology also demonstrate (e.g. Glenberg, et al. 2009), the 
discipline attributes verbal behaviours such as discourse and other 
affective displays to biological factors rather than cultural display 
norms. In psychology, the outer, discursive and material world 
becomes theorised as an inner, emotional essence. However, as 
Catherine Lutz (1990) notes from an anthropological stance, emotion 
is cultural, constructed by people and not nature (40).  
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Within social science more generally, there is strong evidence for 
constructed gendered perceptions of emotionality and in particular, the 
stereotypical view of female emotionality (Shields 2002). Indeed Arlie 
Hochschild in her famous study The Managed Heart (1983) 
conducted in the USA, claimed that women were more emotionally 
expressive than men, and this was due to their social conditioning 
beginning in childhood. Hochschild (1983) is one of the theorists who 
argue that gender roles, emotional expressions and responses are 
socialised into us (see also Eisenberg, Cumberland & Spinrad 1998). 
Hochschild further claimed that women were responsible in society 
for the ‘emotion work’which involved amongst other things, caring 
for others. Specifically, women managed their own as well as men’s 
well-being in relationships. Hochschild argued that the cultural norms 
for doing this work pointed to ‘emotion work’ as a female, rather than 
male, enterprise. This emotion work is linked with notions of the 
‘capacity to care’ (e.g. Hollway 2006) that regards women as being 
more in touch with their emotions, in particular empathy and caring, 
and thus as more suited to the caring professions. Catherine 
Theodosius’s recent study (2008) on emotion work in nursing and 
Billie Hunter and Ruth Deery’s (2009) comments on emotion work 
and midwifery support this view.  
Other researchers argue more generally that our personal 
identities are framed around notions of masculinities and femininities 
(Lyons 2009) and therefore our gender becomes a salient feature of 
who we are. If, as Judith Butler argues, gender is a performative 
construct (Butler 1990), one that is performed through our daily 
activities, then, emotion and the norms of its expression are part of 
this performance. Emotions can be seen as something that we learn 
through our cultural socialisation to express or not express, depending 
highly on the contexts of both gender and situation. Thus emotion can 
become part of our identity, something that we express appropriately 
in the light of societal norms.  
Perceived gender differences that appear in emotionality can be 
seen as being due to cultural expectations of emotional expression and 
long-held stereotypical notions of the ‘emotional female’ and ‘non-
emotional male’. Such a position proposes that emotionality in 
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Western culture is culturally coded as feminine, whereas rationality is 
coded as masculine (Lupton 1998), and masculine identity is bound up 
with restrictive emotionality (Jansz 2000). Jakupcak, Salters, Gratz 
and Roemer (2003) in a psychological study based in the USA, found 
that both masculine ideology and masculine gender roles induced 
men’s fear of emotions. They argue that boys learn through 
socialisation to be less emotional than girls and they show a fear of 
being seen as emotional. Indeed many texts on relationships discuss 
women’s complaints of men withholding emotions and intimacy 
within relationships (Langford 1999; Tannen 1990). As Fivush and 
Buckner (2000) claim, the traditional stereotypes surrounding gender 
and emotion remain. They note that : ‘[a]lthough the traditional 
stereotype of the weeping female and the stoic male have softened 
somewhat over the past twenty years […] one of the strongest 
stereotypes related to gender continues to centre on emotionality’ 
(Fivush and Buckner 2000, 234). Catherine Lutz similarly suggests 
that ‘qualities that define the emotional, also define women. For this 
reason, any discourse on emotion is also, at least implicitly, a 
discourse on gender.’ (Lutz 1990, 151). This cultural coding of 
emotionality as feminine has social and political consequences. 
Kenneth Gergen has noted that “[e]motion terms are socially and 
politically loaded” (Gergen 1999, 108) with emotionality having the 
potential to be used as a subtle and indirect means of evaluating a 
person. Gergen cites examples of common binaries in western society 
for example, ‘rational versus emotional’, ‘effective versus ineffective’, 
and ‘strong versus weak,’ and notes the imbalance provided in the 
binaries, arguing that the former term is often privileged over the 
latter, i.e. it is deemed to be better to be rational rather than emotional. 
These binaries are often used in depictions of sex difference, often 
with men associated with the privileged terms. The notion that women 
are more emotional than men is so ingrained in Western cultural 
beliefs that it is hard to dismantle this myth as a social construction. 
As Shields and Crowley note ‘[i]n so far as they are foundational to 
our understanding of emotion, we may not even recognise them as 
beliefs, but rather revere them as reality’ (Shields & Crowley 1996, 
223). 
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The rhetoric of emotion: insights from discursive psychology 
This view of the binary operations of gender norms and emotion, 
however, leaves little room for individual agency. A third and more 
recent approach in psychology takes the social-constructionist 
approach a step further by studying emotion as discursive and 
interactional. This approach studies the ways emotion discourse and 
concepts are used rhetorically in interactions. The social constructions 
of gender and emotionality contain certain internal contradictions that 
individuals can use to their advantage in interactions. A person’s (in-
)ability to control their emotions, for example, may form a criterion 
for judging their actions and construct dispositions (see also Edwards 
1999). It can be argued that there is a shared Western cultural view 
that emotions, if not controlled, can be dangerous (Parrott 1995), 
something that Catherine Lutz calls the ‘rhetoric of control’ (Lutz 
1990). From this perspective, the corollary of emotional weakness is 
an elevation of social status for those who have the ability to control 
their emotions (Lutz 1990; Parrott 1995). However, rhetorically 
another construction exists in which being unemotional, cold or aloof 
is seen as a negative characteristic, as is the case with restrictive 
masculinity and ‘fear’ of expressing emotions (Jansz 2000; Japucak, et 
al 2003). As Lutz notes when discussing the rhetoric of control, the 
(Western) culturally constructed emotionality of women similarly 
contains a number of contradictions. Although women’s emotions are 
never seen as a characteristic strength or as controllable, women are 
on the one hand seen as pliant and weak, and on the other as 
potentially dangerous, powerful and uncontrollable (Lutz 1990). 
Similarly, emotional expressiveness is on the one hand seen as related 
to better dealings in social relationships (a discourse of emotional 
intelligence), yet, on the other hand, being too emotional has been 
portrayed in a negative light and at times, linked with gender (a 
discourse of vulnerability). These contradictions in the social and 
gender constructions of emotionality leave room for individual 
manoeuvre in interactions. 
An example of such room for manoeuvre can be found in a case 
study in the business realm in the USA by Callahan, Hasler and 
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Tolson (2005). When examining emotional expressiveness and gender 
differences amongst senior executives, they found that female 
executives reported themselves as less emotionally expressive than 
male executives. The authors claim that their results are surprising, as 
femininity and emotional expressiveness are becoming regarded as 
important in the business world. Interestingly, male executives may 
report higher levels of expressiveness due to a ‘changing culture 
which is just beginning to accept “feminine traits” such as 
expressiveness’ (521). However, what is also of interest is that the 
female executives were not willing to claim to be emotionally 
expressive. This example demonstrates not only that there are 
contradictions within the discourse of gender, emotionality and 
leadership in the workplace, but also that individuals are able to 
appropriate these social constructions strategically in their everyday 
lives by profiling themselves as adhering to, or deviating from, them. 
This interactional nature of emotion discourse has been studied 
discursively in psychology (e.g. Buttny 1993; Edwards 1997, 1999; 
Locke 2001, 2003; Locke and Edwards 2003). Rather than studying 
the ‘actual’ role or existence of emotional states, emotions are 
approached as social and discursive phenomena (Edwards 1999; 
Parrot and Harré 1996), produced as part of a narrative framework and 
utilised for accounting purposes. Accounting in this sense refers to the 
ways in which we use language to justify ourselves or blame others. 
Research in this field has demonstrated how emotion discourse and 
concepts can be used rhetorically to construct versions of character 
and to signify to others how events are problematic or out of the 
ordinary (Buttny 1993). It has been proposed that emotion talk or 
discourse is an important part of how social accountability is produced 
(e.g. Lutz 1988, 1990) and forms an integral part of the accounting 
process. It can be used to make sense of people’s actions (Sarbin 
1989), or to imply that circumstances are problematic or out of the 
ordinary (Buttny 1993) or in contrast to rational thought (Edwards 
1999). The literature on emotion discourse within psychology is still 
rather limited and has been related to interpersonal areas such as 
relationship and couple counselling (Edwards 1999) and legal 
discourse (Locke and Edwards 2003). However, it borrows heavily 
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from the sociology of emotion that is firmly routed in social-
constructionist ideals (e.g. Denzin 1984). Derek Edwards (1999) 
proposed a set of rhetorical tropes of emotion discourse such as 
‘irrational’ versus ‘rational’, and ‘event driven’ versus ‘dispositional’, 
where the emotion is constructed as a reaction to an event or as a 
dispositional state, i.e. that it is inferred that a particular person has an 
emotional character.  
The following extract will demonstrate some of the rhetorical 
uses of emotion discourse in action and draws on points made by 
Locke and Edwards (2003), from the cross-examination of the then 
President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton. President 
Clinton is being asked to account for his conduct with Monica 
Lewinsky, an intern he is accused of having sexual relations with, 
which he has denied to this point. The extract follows questions from 
the prosecution asking Clinton to account for his dealings with Ms. 
Lewinsky in the light of her being called as a witness in the Paula 
Jones sexual harassment case against him. What is of interest for this 
chapter is how emotion terms are used rhetorically within discourse to 
account for one’s own behaviour, and to apportion blame to others.  
To sketch a context, throughout the cross-examination it has 
already been claimed that Lewinsky was angry at being unable to see 
Clinton on a particular day because he was in a meeting with another 
woman, thus inferring that there was some cause for Lewinsky’s 
upset. Having discussed Lewinsky’s anger that day at the White 
House, Clinton is invited to confirm that he himself, and his secretary, 
Mrs Currie, were ‘very irate’ with Lewinsky. Q refers to the 
prosecution and C refers to President Clinton.  
 
Clinton testimony 
Q: Isn’t that correct that you and Mrs Currie were very irate 
about that  
 [4 second pause] 
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C: Well I don’t remember all that uh what I remember is that 
she was very um Monica was very upset, she got upset from 
time to time,  
 [10 lines omitted]  
C:   And I was upset about her conduct. I’m not sure I knew or 
focused on at that moment exactly the question you ask. I 
remember I was- I thought her conduct was inappropriate 
that day. 
The prosecutor (Q) invokes both Clinton’s personal secretary (Mrs 
Currie) along with Clinton, as being emphatically, ‘very irate’ with 
Lewinsky’s actions. In his response, Clinton avoids description of his 
own emotions and shifts the attribution to Lewinsky: What he can 
recall is how ‘upset’ she was. Not only was Lewinsky memorably 
upset on that occasion, rather we are immediately informed, that ‘she 
got upset from time to time.’ This represents Lewinsky as getting 
upset not just on the one occasion in question, but repeatedly. It is 
implied that she was perhaps prone to getting upset, such that any 
pursuit of the reasons for her getting upset, on any occasion, might 
look to reasons within her, and not only to external causes such as 
what (in this case) Clinton might have done or said to provoke her. 
Thus there is an important rhetorical move here on Clinton’s part, 
deflecting inquiry away from the proximal causes of Lewinsky’s 
emotions (i.e. potentially his actions), and towards her dispositional 
tendencies of high emotionality. Rather than being prone to getting 
upset, Clinton emerges as understandably reactive to specific 
circumstances, which in this case were Lewinsky’s unreasonable 
demands and reactions. What the analysis here demonstrates is how 
the rhetorical tropes of reactive versus dispositional emotion work 
within our everyday discourse to construct characters and versions of 
events. From this extract we have evidence that being ascribed a high 
level of emotionality can lead to being situated within a ‘discourse of 
vulnerability’: that is, it serves to make the social actor (in this 
example, female) weaker, and represents them as acting out their 
passions, rather than taking rational actions.  
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A second example of a discursive study of emotions comes from 
work by Hannah Frith and Celia Kitzinger (1998), which looks at the 
ways in which young women use emotion, in particular ‘emotion 
work’ as a resource in their accounts of ‘saying no’ to sexual activity 
in a relationship. As earlier studies noted, ‘emotion work’ is regarded 
by many as a gendered concept, with women performing the majority 
of emotion work in interactions. Such studies (e.g. Hochschild 1983) 
use ‘emotion work’ as an analysts’ rather than participants’ category, 
thus viewing accounts as somehow reflecting the ‘actual’ emotion 
work taking place. What Frith and Kitzinger argue through an in-
depth analysis of focus group discussions with young women is that 
whether women appear to be involved in ‘actual’ emotion work or not 
(and they argue, there is no way of knowing this from self-report), 
‘emotion work’ also functions as a useful category for the young 
women to claim that they have to manage in their interactions with 
young men. An example of this in practice is given in the extract 
below. This extract is quoted from Frith and Kitzinger (1998, 311) 
 
‘Just say no’: Emotion work extract 
JILL:  But if you were in a relationship and you said 
no, then he could end up feeling ‘Oh God’, you 
know, ‘what’s going on?…he could end up 
getting really upset about it, and you wouldn’t 
really want that … If you had a  boyfriend and 
you said no, then they would think things like –  
KAREN:  - ‘Oh what’s wrong with me? She should enjoy 
it.’ 
JILL:  Yeah, get worried, and think whether you were 
still interested or not.  
KAREN:  Yeah, so you’d have to be very careful –  
JILL:  - and then they might ask questions, and you 
might end up saying, ‘Well there’s nothing 
actually wrong’  
INTERVIEWER:  ‘I just don’t feel like it, actually’ 
JILL:  I think boys would find that very difficult. 
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KAREN:  ‘Don’t you find me attractive?’, and all this 
stuff, and you think, ‘No just …’ 
As Frith and Kitzinger (1998) note, in this extract all of the 
participants, including the interviewer, are constructing saying no to 
sexual activity as something that is accountable, i.e. needs to be 
justified. They note that in their data, the young women talked in 
terms of performing this emotion work, as in this case, managing the 
feelings of the young men when they did not want to sleep with their 
partners. Frith and Kitzinger argued that rather than demonstrating 
women did actually perform this emotion work, their talking in such 
terms portrayed the women as emotionally strong – ‘knowledgeable 
and sophisticated social actors’ (312) able to manage the demands of 
men, whereas their positioning of men in their talk depicts the males 
‘as emotional weaklings who agonise about their own sexual 
desirability and performance’ (312). The speakers actively voice what 
the responses would be from these generic males: ‘don’t you find me 
attractive?’ Frith and Kitzinger (1998) note that for the young women 
in their sample, and by implication elsewhere, emotion work is used 
as a resource to maintain the presentation of self (Goffman 1959) and 
is useful in interaction to manage issues of identity, in particular to 
portray themselves as strong, young women. If the traditional analyst 
take to emotion work had been followed, the talk would have been 
taken as transparent and these specific uses of emotion work would 
have been overlooked. When we consider the perceived stereotypical 
relationships between emotion and gender, we can see that a 
discursive psychological approach, inspired in part by the social-
constructionist movement, offers a differing perspective, one that 
focuses on what the invocation of emotion talk accomplishes in the 
local interaction. When we consider perceived relationships between 
gender and emotion in everyday life, an understanding of how the 
concepts are used discursively is crucial to see how such discourses 
operate in shaping, maintaining, and resisting the social order.  
 
Concluding comments 
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Psychology as a discipline is a ‘broad church’, operating from a 
variety of standpoints, from neuroscience to cognitive and social 
approaches. This essay has focused on the social aspects of 
psychology and investigated how sex differences in emotions come to 
be documented and interpreted within psychological theory. Within 
much of psychology, emotions still form part of a wider essentialist 
movement. In its search for the ‘grand theory’ of emotion, a theory 
that would fit a global, cross-cultural model, psychology has typically 
overlooked issues to do with society, culture, and power, amongst 
others. In essence then it has ignored the social construction and 
contextuality of emotion. This chapter presented the evidence for a 
social-constructionist view of the emotions and gender, and 
subsequently introduced the new approach of discursive psychology, 
which analyses how emotion talk is used as an interactional resource 
in gendered contexts. We saw on the one hand how it was used by Bill 
Clinton to construct Monica Lewinsky as having an emotional 
disposition. On the other, we saw how young women used ‘emotion 
work’ as a strategy to manage presentation of themselves when 
discussing relations with the opposite sex. Both of these avenues of 
investigation were made possible by the advent of social 
constructionism into psychology.  
Whilst social-constructionist and discursive approaches to 
emotion have allowed a thorough reconsideration and reframing of 
social psychology, it has recently been suggested that yet another new 
approach is called for.  Greco and Stenner (2008) argue that since 
emotion is where the different areas of psychology converge, the time 
has come to study emotion from transdisciplinary perspectives (see 
also Brown and Stenner 2009). Until we do so, they argue, we will 
never completely understand the phenomenon of emotion. However 
this new field of ‘Affective Science’ develops, it is certain that the 
relation between emotions, sex and gender will remain a topic for 
discussion.  
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